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FEATURE ARTICLE
Private Antitrust as a Public Good1
Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin
and Compcare Health Services Insurance Corp.,
v. The Marshfield Clinic and Security Health
Plan of Wisconsin, Inc.
by Warren Greenberg
In February 1994, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield United of Wisconsin ("Blue Cross") and
its wholly-owned health maintenance organiza-
tion ("HMO"), Compcare Health Services
("Compcare"), brought suit against the
Marshfield Clinic("Marshfield"), a group of 400
physicians, and its wholly owned HMO, Secu-
rity Health Plan, for their alleged violations of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act2 as well as
State of Wisconsin antitrust statutes.3
Blue Cross asserted in its Complaint that
Marshfield Clinic physicians would not negoti-
ate in good faith with Compcare and, in particu-
lar, would only allow a modest discount on
charges for Marshfield physicians who would
contract with Compcare HMO.4 Moreover,
Marshfield Clinic physicians would not accept
any utilization controls on physician services. In
addition, Blue Cross asserted that
it was paying higher fees for phy-
sician services because the north- Dr Warre
west Wisconsin area was monopo- and Heal
lized by Marshfield. sity, Wash
Blue Cross sought relief Economic
which would allow its HMO to en- centratio
ter the market on reasonable pay- while stafj
ment terms. It asked for the re- Greenber
moval of barriers-to-entry in phy- care sectc
sician primary care and specialty markets. In
addition, Blue Cross sought the divestiture of a
number of satellite primary care clinics which
Marshfield Clinic had previously purchased from
independent physicians. Finally, Marshfield
Clinic was to be prohibited from allocating mar-
kets with a number of nearby HMOs and clinics.
Although Compcare and Blue Cross
would gain from the lower fees negotiated with
Marshfield physicians, and would potentially
benefit from a more competitive physician ser-
vices market, there are significant costs in liti-
gating this case. Moreover, other managed care
plans and insuring organizations in the geo-
graphic area might reap the benefits of a poten-
tial Blue Cross victory and a more competitive
market without bearing the costs of litigation. In
short, they might be able to free ride on the po-
n Greenberg is a Professor of Health Economics
th Care Sciences at George Washington Univer-
ington, D.C. Dr. Greenberg received his Ph.D. in
*s from Bryn Mawr College in 1972 with a con-
i in industrial organization. In the mid-1970s,
reconomist at the Federal Trade Commission, Dr
g concentrated on economic analysis of the health
9r.
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tential success of Blue Cross.
This paper will first describe Marshfield
in more detail. Second, it will describe the ben-
efits that Blue Cross would receive from win-
ning this case and will estimate the costs to Blue
Cross in this litigation. The paper also will esti-
mate the potential benefits to third parties if Blue
Cross were to win this case. Finally it will esti-
mate the public good aspects of this case, and
identify the market characteristics under which
firms will bring antitrust cases when others will
be able to benefit from the result.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Marshfield
Clinic
The Marshfield Clinic is the fifth largest
clinic in the United States. It consists of 400 phy-
sicians, 300 of whom practice at the Marshfield
Clinic in Marshfield, Wisconsin.5 In addition to
the Marshfield Clinic headquarters, the Clinic
owns and operates 23 satellite clinics through-
out northwest Wisconsin. There are between
three and fifteen physicians at each of these clin-
ics with many of the physicians practicing pri-
mary care medicine. Most of the physicians at
the Marshfield Clinic headquarters are specialty
care physicians. Marshfield physicians are paid
on a salary basis.6
Since 1986 the Marshfield Clinic has
been sole owner of Security Health Plan ("SHIP"),
an individual practice association ("IPA") HMO
based in Marshfield, with 300 non-Marshfield
employed physician affiliates and approximately
70,0007 enrollees throughout northwest and cen-
tral Wisconsin. The physician affiliates are paid
on a capitated basis, and are required by con-
tract to refer all of their SHP patients to
Marshfield for specialized care.8 The physician
affiliates also see non-SHP patients and many of
these patients are referred to the Marshfield
Clinic for specialty services as well.
The Marshfield Clinic also controls the
524-bed St. Joseph's Hospital, the largest hospi-
tal in the Northwest Wisconsin market. It is a
nonprofit hospital owned and operated by the
Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother. Only physicians
employed by the Marshfield Clinic have full staff
privileges. 9 St. Joseph's also has the most sophis-
ticated equipment; specializing in cardiac sur-
gery, neonatal care, and oncology in the area. The
three other hospitals in central and northern Wis-
consin with more than 200 staffed beds are
Wausau Hospital, Sacred Heart Hospital-Eau
Claire, and Luther Hospital.
The physician product market may be
broken out into primary, pediatric, and specialty
care components. Cross-elasticity of demand for
primary care services and pediatric services ap-
pears to be low. Although some children would
occasionally visit a primary care physician, most
would probably see pediatricians. Adults would
rarely visit a pediatrician.
Specialty care physicians were defined
in terms of services delivered in 400 plus diag-
nostic-related-groups ("DRGs") at in-patient
hospital settings. It was believed, for example,
that there was little cross-elasticity of demand
between, for example, eye surgery and different
types of heart surgery. It was also believed that
there was little cross-elasticity of supply for dif-
ferent types of surgeons and physicians.
The Marshfield Clinic market share ex-
ceeded 60 percent of patient events (the number
of times that patients saw physicians during the
year) for each of three years from 1991-1994 in
nine of thirteen satellite clinics of Marshfield in
primary physician care and in eight of thirteen
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clinics in pediatric care. The other ten clinics
had insufficient data or consisted mostly of spe-
cialty physicians.
The specialty markets consisted of the
number of procedures performed at St. Joseph's
Hospital where only Marshfield Clinic physicians
practiced. In fourteen markets including cardiac
valve surgery, bypass surgery, and chemotherapy,
St. Joseph's Hospital performed more than 60
percent of the procedures in the relevant geo-
graphic market for the years 1991-1994.
The relevant
geographic market
for primary care phy-
sicians and pediatri-
cians was defined in
terms of geographic
markets surrounding
each of the twenty-
three satellite clinics.
A thirty-mile radius
was set, and was in-
creased by ten-mile
increments until Elzinga-Hogarty calculations
of 75 percent combined LIFO (Little-In-From-
Outside) and LOFI (Little-Out-From-Inside)
were met.'0
For specialty care markets, a map was
drawn which would encompass all of Northwest
Wisconsin based on the referring patterns of
Marshfield Clinic's 23 satellite clinics. Elzinga-
Hogarty statistics were calculated for each of the
more than 400 DRGs in the geographic area with
nearly all passing the 75 percent Elzinga-Hogarty
cut-off point.
Along with the high market shares of the
Marshfield Clinic are the high barriers-to-entry
for physician services erected by Marshfield.
Only Marshfield physicians were provided staff
Hospital.
privileges at the four hospitals dominated by
Marshfield including St. Joseph's Hospital."
This, of course, inhibits growth of primary care
or specialty care physicians. Marshfield physi-
cians also would refuse to provide cross cover-
age to non-Marshfield physicians who needed
to be absent from their practice for a few days.
Marshfield also enforced a non-compete clause
with its formerly employed physicians which
kept such physicians from practicing medicine
within thirty miles of the Marshfield Clinic for
three years after ter-
mination.
Another
barrier to the spe-
cialty care physician
services market is
the Wisconsin capi-
tal expenditure re-
view program
("CER") which re-
quires approval
through the Cost
Containment Commission of most expenditures
exceeding $1,000,000 for hospital-based insti-
tutions and exceeding $500,000 for clinic based
institutions.' 2 Because of pressure by existing
hospitals, it is often difficult to justify to regula-
tory agencies the entry of a new hospital or the
purchase of new equipment. Without new ter-
tiary care facilities, specialists will be deterred
from entering the market.
Finally, the referral network to
Marshfield Clinic physicians may increase the
proficiency of specialty services as more proce-
dures are performed at Saint Joseph's Hospital.
This increased number of procedures can be a
circular phenomenon which may lead to even
more referrals to specialty care, thus creating a
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barrier-to-entry. At the same time, specialists will
refer patients back to the primary care physicians
of Marshfield.
Patients who visit a Marshfield Clinic
physician generally are aware that for specialty
services the patient would be referred to a
Marshfield Clinic specialist and would most
likely be treated at St. Joseph's Hospital. Refer-
rals increase the demand for Marshfield Clinic
primary care physicians which, in turn, increases
the referral to and demand for Marshfield Clinic
specialists.
The dominance of St. Joseph's Hospital
engendered by the link between Marshfield
Clinic's primary and specialty care appears to
be reflected in its financial data. St. Joseph's rate
of return computed as net income as a percent of
total assets was 13.5 percent in 1991,13 compared
to 7.7 percent at Sacred-Heart Hospital-Eau
Claire, 6.3 percent at Wausau, and 6.8 percent at
Luther. 4 St. Joseph's rate of return on equity for
1991 was 18.2 per cent compared to 9.6 per cent
at Sacred Heart, 15.0 per cent at Wausau, and
11.5 per cent at Luther.'5 These high rates of re-
turn may reflect the market dominance of
Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital in
specialty services in the Northwest Wisconsin
market.
The Marshfield Clinic and its primary and
specialty physicians, the St. Joseph's Hospital,
and the Security HMO, formed a vertically inte-
grated network. Each of the components of the
network led to the monopolization of primary
care and specialty physician services. The St.
Joseph's Hospital benefitted by the stream of
Marshfield referrals. It also benefitted by the
patients from Security HMO. Yet the biggest
beneficiaries were the Marshfield physicians.
Because of their control of St. Joseph's and three
additional hospitals, it was very difficult for new
physicians to enter the market. Control of Secu-
rity also made it difficult for non-Marshfield
physicians to gain referrals. Those physicians
who were affiliated with Security were required
to refer to Marshfield and often referred non-
Marshfield patients as well. The loss of Security
patients could be a devastating blow for non-
compliance.
There were no attempts made to calcu-
late the potential benefits of vertical integration.
One such benefit may be to provide information
to the patient such that getting into the Marshfield
system would provide a certain level of health
care. There were also no attempts made to cal-
culate the costs of vertical integration other than
to suggest that vertical integration here can lead
to monopoly power. In general, vertical integra-
tion can be benign except when linked to the es-
tablishment of monopoly power. In the health
care industry, the probability of hospital staff
privilege foreclosure and HMO referrals can
make vertical integration suspect where there are
high market shares of hospitals coupled with an
HMO presence.
Potential benefits to Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Wisconsin of an antitrust
victory
The damages of the refusal to deal with
Compcare were calculated at approximately $5.1
million from 1990 to 1995.16 In addition to the
damages incurred by the exclusion of the
Compcare HMO, Blue Cross was affected by the
high prices of Marshfield physician services. For
primary care, pediatric care, and specialty care
services, the damages were calculated at approxi-
mately $595,000.11 When trebled under the
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Sherman Act the damages total to $17.1 mil-
lion. 8
Were there also other benefits which
might accrue to Blue Cross? Perhaps there might
be value of deterring other physician groups in
Wisconsin who might not negotiate with Blue
Cross. In addition, although Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans throughout the United States form
a weak association, benefits may be positive to
many other plans in the Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association. Quantification of these last
two possible benefits were not possible.
Potential costs to Blue Cross and Blue
Shield
The costs to Blue Cross are equal to at-
torney fees, other consultant fees, and the op-
portunity costs of Blue Cross officials and em-
ployees who helped with document preparation
and assistance on this case. The attorney fees are
approximately $2.5 million according to the pa-
pers filed with the District Court; economic con-
sulting fees approximately $400,000; and the op-
portunity costs of Blue Cross individuals is at a
minimum of $64,000 (based on two executives
at a two-week trial and six weeks of effort prior
to trial) with no guarantee of winning. Total costs
were, therefore, approximately $3.0 million.
Moreover, there is the possibility of fu-
ture legal and consulting costs and opportunity
costs of Blue Cross officials during an appeals
process.
The benefits and costs to Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of bringing legal action
With a benefit-to-cost ratio of 17 to 3
($17 million awarded by the judge at a $3 mil-
lion cost), Blue Cross needed less than a twenty
percent chance of winning in order to bring this
suit. Blue Cross, of course, had to take into con-
sideration risks such that the potential evidence
would not be as convincing as Blue Cross be-
lieved, or defendant's had evidence about which
Blue Cross was unaware.
Public benefits if Blue Cross wins
If Blue Cross wins, entry will be easier
for other HMOs which would like to enter the
northwest Wisconsin market since Marshfield
would have to negotiate with all potential en-
trants. It will also reduce prices of physician ser-
vices to all health care plans since physician's
services will no longer be monopolized.
How does one measure the public ben-
efits? The public benefits would be equal to the
market share of the private and public third party
insuring organizations in the state minus the
market share of Blue Cross. Thus, Blue Cross
has a market share of seventeen percent in 1993
with eighty-three percent for the other insuring
organizations, leaving out potential entry. Thus,
the bulk of the gains will accrue to non-Blue
Cross subscribers.
Why would firms bring antitrust actions
when other parties benefit?
There is a greater proportion of private
antitrust suits brought today than at any time in
the nation's history.' 9 Prior to the 1980s, private
firms brought six times as many suits as the gov-
ernment, whereas in the 1980s, there were ten
times as many suits.20 According to the
Georgetown University study of antitrust litiga-
tion, private suits have been predominant dur-
ing the forty-three years (from 1941-1984) of
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their study.2 More than 1,000 private antitrust
suits are filed each year. Of course, not all cases
have public good effects and may involve sim-
ply internal private disputes between the par-
ties.
First, it appears that firms will bring an-
titrust actions when the internal benefits exceed
the internal costs; adjusted for risk of winning
the suit. All things equal, benefits will be greater,
the greater the market share of the firm. One
might also hypothesize that higher market shares
will allow firms to capture most or a good por-
tion of the benefits. This will allow firms to re-
duce the public benefits of the antitrust action.
A second hypothesis is that firms would
be more willing to bring an antitrust action when
no other potential competitor has a market share
which is significant. With a significant market
share, the next largest firm would be able to cap-
ture most of the public benefits and challenge
the leading firm on an equal basis.
Third, a firm is more anxious to bring an
action when significant damages can be collected
for past antitrust violations. As we have seen,
Blue Cross was awarded a $17 million judgment
for just five years of antitrust damages.
Fourth, firms may bring antitrust suits
when there may be substantial time lags before
the entry of new firms. For example, in
Marshfield, Blue Cross may have had market-
ing and brand name advantages over other health
insuring organizations. Blue Cross may have
been able to gain large benefits before new firms
could decide when and if to enter as well the
period of time in developing brand name loyal-
ties.
Fifth, the average plaintiff gains 1.2 per-
cent of the equity value of the firm in wealth gains
when the announcement of the antitrust filing
occurs.22 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wiscon-
sin as a for-profit firm, might have foreseen simi-
lar increases in wealth.
Conclusion
There are a number of reasons why firms
may bring private antitrust suits even though
there are possibilities of public good effects
which accrue to other firms. Public policy offi-
cials at the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission may want to be cognizant of
the factors which lead firms to bring private an-
titrust suits and reserve their resources for cases
in which these or other factors are not present.
There may also be the possibility of filing an
amicus brief. In cases which involve significant
legal precedent, however, public policy officials
may want to act regardless of private action.
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